Market Comment: Opinions on a New Political Era
Interesting Times, Indeed
The intersection of investing and politics is a dangerous one, indeed. It would be foolish to say there is zero interplay between the two. For example, markets typically do better before an election than after, though the effect is small. But countless investors have made irreversible errors by overplaying the importance of politics, because politics feel so important to us as individuals. We don’t have lively dinner-table debates about price-to-earnings ratios, after all.
That being said, the incoming administration is proposing very broad and sweeping economic changes. So, we’ve put together a longer-than-usual market comment for the new year. Here’s how our discussion is structured:
Part 1: How to Navigate Trump v2 as an Investor, by Jim Hemphill
Part 2: Republicans Party Like It’s 1699, by Marvin Barron
In Part 1, Jim, a lifelong Reagan Republican, shares his lens for separating his political life from his investment thinking. In Part 2, Marvin, a GenX Southern Democrat, takes a stab at forecasting the impact of the new administration’s policies as proposed.
PART 1: How to Navigate Trump v2 as an Investor
Jim Hemphill, CFP® CIMA® CPWA®
Chief Investment Strategist & Managing Director
I support the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that was recently passed by Congress. That does not matter. It is the law. There are some of you here in the Justice Department who oppose the new Civil Rights Act of 1964. That does not matter. It is the law.
Paraphrasing Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, speaking to senior US attorneys in 1964[i]
MAINTAIN PERSPECTIVE
The election is over. The result–a clear and broad, yet fairly shallow victory for former President Donald Trump and his Republican Party–will please some and disappoint others. As a lifelong Reagan Republican and committed Never-Trumper, to say I’m on the disappointed side is putting it mildly. If you’d like my uncensored perspective on Trump’s victory and what it represents to me as an historian, I’d be happy to chat any time, perhaps over an adult beverage or three.
But that’s not the point of this commentary. My views on the politics of it all don’t change my or TGS’s practical, legal, and moral obligation to each of our clients. Our job is to help you navigate the always-uncertain financial markets with the right balance between growth and risk, ambition and prudence. Just like Bobby Kennedy’s young attorneys in 1964, our feelings don’t matter, but our job and fiduciary obligation to our clients matter very much indeed.
As investors contemplating the beginning of Trump’s second term, we face these questions: what do we know, what don’t we know, and what should we do with our money?
Trump’s election in itself has removed a large source of uncertainty for markets; there will be no second Trump loss followed by an uprising from his followers, and no constitutional crisis caused by another attempt to subvert the results. Unlike in 2020, the losing candidate has accepted the result, Trump will take office on January 20, and it seems both the Bidens and the Harrises will attend Trump’s second inauguration.
Trump will return to office having made many threats and promises. We can never be sure which particular promises any president-elect intends to keep, much less whether circumstances will permit him to keep them. In 1988, George H. W. Bush told the American public, “Read my lips. No new taxes!” Then he raised taxes, Congressional Democrats failed to deliver spending cuts, and Bush lost his re-election bid. In 1992, Bill Clinton promised a middle-class tax cut he knew was unaffordable, and which he was unable to deliver. But economic growth was strong on his watch, and he was re-elected by a comfortable margin in 1996.
Politicians often overpromise and underdeliver. Predicting policy is especially difficult with Trump, whose remarks are so often unscripted.
START WITH THE ECONOMY
Let’s consider the economic background as Trump prepares to take office. The US economy has made an apparently soft landing. After raising interest rates 11 times between 2022 and 2023, the Federal Reserve has cut rates at its last three meetings. Inflation has moderated; from the peak above 6% in September of 2023, core inflation has fallen sharply and has stayed below 3.5% for the last three quarters.
Employment growth has been strong, unemployment is near historical lows, real incomes are rising again, and US drilling activity and energy production are at all-time highs. Home prices are high, creating both a wealth effect for homeowners (positive for the economy) and a powerful barrier to homeownership for those on the outside looking in (challenging for young families and Baby Boomers looking to downsize or relocate). On the negative side, budget deficits are large, interest costs on the national debt are about to exceed defense spending, and both Social Security and Medicare are underfunded.
Strength in the US economy has been reflected in strength in the equity markets. A post-election surge in stock prices reflected expectations of another “Trump Trade,” like the strong market advance that followed Trump’s surprise victory in 2016, while concerns about a blip in inflation and a more cautious Fed policy toward rate cuts led to a December retreat in stock prices.
Even before Trump takes office, we are currently in the most expensive stock market in human history—more so than the market at the peak of the tech bubble in early 2000 with Bill Clinton still in the White House; more expensive than at the stock market peak in early 2020 during Trump’s first term, pre-COVID; and also more pricey than in late 2021, just before 2022’s brief but brutal bear market driven by inflation during Biden’s first and only term.
CONSIDER IMMEDIATE POLICY
The two aspects of Trump’s economic program that most worry mainstream economists are tariffs and a possible attempt to compromise the independence of the Federal Reserve.
Since the 1980s, Trump has been a fan of tariffs, about which he’s remarkably ignorant. (“Trade wars are good and easy to win.”) In his first term, Trump used tariffs in a disorganized way to try to secure economic advantages. This time, Trump has already threatened punitive tariffs against Canada and Mexico, our two principal trading partners, and has floated the idea of using high tariffs across the board to replace much of the government’s existing tax base.
Economists across the political spectrum agree that protectionism reduces both real wealth and economic growth. Since the Second World War, the steady dismantling of trade barriers and broadening of free trade have led to the greatest period of economic growth in human history, with more than two billion people rising from desperate poverty into the global middle class.
On the other hand, the same globalization that made the world’s poor so much richer, and which has created a growing worldwide class of multi-billionaires, has also been costly to the middle classes in much of the developed world. Too much of the economic benefit of a richer world has accrued to the top 1%. Factory workers have lost their jobs, some manufacturing has moved offshore, and rural communities have been hollowed out. High rates of illegal immigration have led to higher crime, a loss of social cohesion, and downward pressure on real wages. All of these negative effects have been felt most strongly among less-educated voters.
Since COVID’s disruptions, there’s been a global move toward shortening supply chains, bringing more production onshore, and building a more resilient manufacturing sector. Despite this trend, US industry still relies on foreign production for many crucial components. You can’t build a vehicle in Dearborn, Michigan, without wire harnesses imported from China, engine assemblies sourced from Canada, and transmissions manufactured in Mexico.
At best, tariffs could be a stick used to encourage greater access to foreign markets for US producers. At worst, they could result in higher prices, reduced US production, and sharply higher inflation. A wider trade war could cause a global contraction, as did the Smoot-Hawley tariffs in the 1930s, which resulted in the worldwide Great Depression.
Some Trump advisers support a strong dollar and hope to see a return to the King Dollar policies of the Reagan years in the 1980s. Others want our trading partners to strengthen their own currencies, weakening the dollar and giving US exporters a competitive advantage. Trump doesn’t understand this tension, but his policies will largely determine the relative value of the US dollar, and by implication the dollar’s status as the global reserve currency.
LOOK OUT FOR THE LONG TERM
Perhaps the single most dangerous Trump impulse is his desire to eliminate the independence of our central bank, the Federal Reserve.
When the Federal Reserve system was established in 1913, it was structured to preserve its independence from the political system. The Fed is charged with balancing two competing mandates: maintaining full employment and preserving the value of the dollar. Most rich democracies have similar systems designed to insulate their central banks from everyday partisan politics.
What Trump wants is to be able to dictate interest rates and money supply creation to his advantage right now, ignoring the long-term implications for inflation and economic growth. This appears unwise, though not entirely without precedent. Arguably the greatest failing of Jimmy Carter’s presidency was his appointment of a businessman, G. William Miller, as Fed Chairman, and giving him the mandate to return the US economy to full utilization by loosening the money supply. The result was the worst inflation in decades, followed by Carter’s replacement by Ronald Reagan, followed by the worst recession since the Great Depression.
Wise nations protect their central banks from politicians for good reason. Those that make their central banks serve short-term political interests, like Argentina, Greece, and Turkey, often end up with dysfunctional cycles of overspending, money creation, inflation, austerity, and contraction.
If Trump compromises the Fed’s independence, there will no longer be any independent constraint on money creation, interest rates, or the size of our deficits and national debt. We’ll be Argentina.
Trump may be misinformed about economics, but like any other elected official, his self-interest may temper his policy choices. A tension exists between Trump’s willingness to upset all possible apple carts and his obsessive focus on his own popularity. In his first term, Trump measured his success in large part by the rising stock market. Might he modify his short-term economic policies if stock prices falter? In broader terms, how will he strike the balance between his promises, his popularity, and his desire to exercise power without constraint?
There’s an aspect of Trump’s likely policies with which I’m more sympathetic, which is his sentiment about deregulation. Like most modern mixed economies, the US economy operates under severe regulatory constraints. Again, like other rich countries, our freedoms are in tension with the administrative state’s desire for ever-more centralized power. Can Trump harness the energy of the private sector to reduce drag from regulatory excess and overspending? More importantly, can a Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), with no prior practice or legal basis in legislation, cut costs and regulations without violating the rule of law?
Trump has pledged to “drill, baby, drill” as soon as he takes office. This promise means little. Federal oil and gas lease grants are already at all-time highs under Biden, as is US energy production. The move from coal-fired plants to natural gas produced by fracking has already significantly reduced CO2 emissions.[ii] Approving the long-delayed Keystone pipeline might cause a minor decrease in emissions, since Canadian oil is currently shipped by trains burning diesel fuel, and pipelines are safer, cheaper, and much less polluting than railcars.
While climate change is real and dangerous, with particularly profound negative effects on agriculture and fisheries, much US climate policy has been about things other than the effective limitation of CO2 emissions. For example, boosting electric vehicle sales through tax incentives without any realistic means to reduce global emissions on the generation side is projected to have almost zero effect on climate over the next half-century.
An actual clean energy transition would require the embrace of next-generation nuclear power or the effective development and commercialization of fusion power. Both are likely to be years or even decades away. Absent a fission renaissance or a fusion breakthrough, meeting US energy demands will require burning fossil fuels for decades. Trump policies may waste less money on uneconomic renewables and environmentally disastrous lithium mining, while removing uncertainty around spending on oil and gas exploration, production, and infrastructure.
CONSIDER THE BIG PICTURE
Trump’s isolationism, affection for dictators, and transactional approach to foreign policy prompt geopolitical security concerns. His pro-Russian, anti-NATO foreign policy could further destabilize Europe. Some observers suggest China intends to invade Taiwan by 2027. How will the US react to provocations by dictators Trump foolishly considers his friends? Can our long-term allies in Europe and Asia count on the US fulfilling its treaty obligations? Will friendly governments share intelligence with a National Security Agency helmed by suspected Russian asset Tulsi Gabbard?
In my opinion as an historian, these are crucial questions, with implications for the future of freedom in the world. As an investment-decision maker, I plan to ignore them all. History suggests that even the most brutal armed conflicts, with their resulting grievous loss of life and limb, have little predictable effect on financial markets.
WHAT TO DO? REMEMBER THESE THINGS
• Separate emotion and politics from investment decision-making.
• Discount Trump’s threats and promises but pay close attention to his policies.
• Hope our constitutional protections against unchecked presidential power remain robust. Look for signals that the Republican-controlled Senate will remain at least somewhat independent, and that the Federal Reserve will remain free of political control.
• As always, focus on price and cash flow, not on recent past performance.
• In particular, avoid chasing performance in the range of speculative assets that surged both before and after the election. This includes tech stocks and cryptocurrencies.
• Tilt toward asset classes that are out of favor, produce durable cash flows, and are trading at reasonable prices.
• Look for signals about the likely relative strength of the dollar. A strong dollar supports higher US stock and bond prices, while a weak dollar increases the relative returns of foreign assets. Foreign stocks are historically cheap in comparison to US stocks.
• For those in or approaching retirement, consider exchanging highly-priced risk assets for sensibly-priced guaranteed cash flows.
• We’ve already shifted funds into energy infrastructure plays, and we expect to add to those positions.
• Consider maintaining a larger-than-usual reserve of cash equivalents and short-term investment grade bonds.
At a recent client event, a fellow I’ve known for almost a half-century commented, “If we ever wondered what we’d have done if we lived in Germany in 1933, now we’ll get to find out.” I hope he’s unduly pessimistic.
Whatever happens, you can be certain that our constant focus will be on the economic interests, financial confidence, and life goals of each of our clients.
PART 2: Republicans Party Like It’s 1699
Marvin Barron, CFP®
Research Director
THE NEO-MERCANTILIST MOMENT
Mercantilism was Europe’s dominant economic model for three centuries leading up to America’s formation. Its basic idea–that economic resources of all kinds are limited, and the state needs to pick its champions and empower them to go and gather those resources–is having a resurgence among right-leaning parties around the world.
As an economic system, mercantilism came into being around the time of Columbus’s voyage to America in 1492 and ended with the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. It wasn’t until 1776 (an auspicious year, indeed!) that there was even a name for this mostly European economic model. That’s when Adam Smith coined the term “mercantile system” in his Wealth of Nations.
Today, and around the world, mercantilism is making a comeback, with Trump’s Republican Party proposing the largest-scale mercantilist experiment. As it did three hundred years ago, the modern flavor of mercantilism has recognizable themes:
ORIGINAL MERCANTILE IDEA: Use tariffs to restrict international trade. MODERN TAKE: same.
ORIGINAL: Limit immigration in; encourage emigration out. MODERN: Emigration is now deportation.
ORIGINAL: Government sponsors corporate champions. MODERN: Hello Elon; bye-bye TikTok.
ORIGINAL: Concentrate wealth with nobles, who will manage the economy. MODERN: Today’s nobility has MBAs.
ORIGINAL: Fix the money supply in gold / silver. MODERN: Bitcoin is “neo-gold.”
ORIGINAL: Secure resources with colonies. MODERN: Hi Greenland, nice island you’ve got there.
Whether you agree with these policies or not (and I, generally, do not), the first thing to recognize is that there is a pattern and unifying concept behind them. They are not random. The second thing to remember is that it remains possible to succeed as an investor, even in a mercantilist economic system. The British East India Company made money for its shareholders from 1600 to 1858, and while I’m not completely sure that Amazon is its direct, modern incarnation, the similarities in their corporate ambitions are hard to ignore.
But for neo-mercantilist policies to take root, they will have to be enacted by legislatures and upheld by courts, none of which existed the last time around. After that, they will have to be enforced, which is the true Achilles’ heel of mercantilist policies. For example, tariffs–a cornerstone of mercantilist thought–tend to create as much corruption as revenue, because importers quickly learn how to grease the wheels with import inspectors.
In general, I doubt the problems that doomed mercantilism in the past (political corruption, currency panics, and a lower base rate of innovation) will be solved. As a result, I’m focused on three key ideas to start 2025.
GOVERNING IS HARDER THAN CAMPAIGNING
Donald Trump left office in 2021 with a 34% approval rating, the lowest of his first presidency. Forty-five months later, in November, he won 51% of the vote, making him the first Republican candidate to win the popular vote since George W. Bush in 2004. Pulling off that turnaround required Trump to make competing promises to his constituents, which puts both him and the Republican Party in a bind. Governing is much harder than campaigning.
In their campaign, Trump and JD Vance won by running on a straightforward, public platform of American nativism, hierarchical leadership, religious (Protestant) nationalism, and a pledge to bring prices down after the post-COVID inflation years. Right-leaning parties across the globe have been winning elections since 2023 on similar platforms, with the religious component varying by local conditions. So, Trump’s victory makes sense within the context of a global rightward shift. In France, Germany, India, Australia, Sweden, Israel, Argentina, and other countries, nationalist parties have made variations on this simple argument: Our country is overextended and it’s gotten too expensive; if we pull back and focus on boosting our own, things will get better. In total, there are four billion or so people who find this argument persuasive.
In the US, this leaves Trump with two problems. The first is that his campaign platform appeals to his “Team Bannon” working-class electoral base, but not his “Team Billionaire” executive leadership team. This was illustrated in a Christmas-week Twitter / X debate between Republican nativists who were promised a freeze on immigration paired with widespread deportation, and Republican corporatists who have demanded more high-skilled H-1B engineers and low-skilled seasonal immigrant laborers. In this particular round, Trump sided with Team Billionaire, who funded his campaign, over Team Bannon, who supplied his votes. For the next two years, with Republicans in full control of the federal government and 23 states, this intra-party tension will be the key battleground for policy debates in America and will largely determine which neo-mercantilist policies gain traction, and which fall through the cracks.
INFLATION HIDES IN MANY PLACES
That leads to Trump’s second problem. The carrot he’s promised to his base is lower inflation, if not outright deflation. But the various policies he’s promoted are both highly inflationary and short-term recessionary. I worry that Trump and the Republican Party are captured by magical thinking about the true cost of their policies, in much the same way Democrats were in denial about the inflationary and recessionary nature of labor market controls in the 1970s. Such magical thinking tends to have the predictable result of the political apparatus attacking the Federal Reserve, which has a mandate to prioritize fighting inflation over preventing a recession.
Neo-mercantalists claim that Trump’s policies will be worth the pain over the long term. They are on a mission to fundamentally reorganize the economy and believe that reorganization will pay for the short-term inflationary and recessionary price tags. My worry is simply that they’ve miscalculated, and that when the next election comes around, they’ll force the Federal Reserve to keep interest rates artificially low, resulting in a second round of global inflation.
TRUMP IS, AT LEAST, AMBITIOUS
I’ve already noted that my personal opinions do not mesh well with the policies of the neo-mercantilist movement, as I am both a believer in classical economics and by nature a global humanist. But as Jim correctly notes, personal philosophy should not trump investment analysis. So as an investor, what strikes me most about Trump’s proposals is their sheer ambition. If he is successful in executing them, for better or worse, he will succeed in changing the foundations of the American economy on a scale not seen since the 1980s or perhaps the 1950s.
Without further comment, the following tables illustrate that sheer scale and my guesstimates on the economic impact of the policies as promoted in Trump’s speeches.
Policy 1: Deport 12 million undocumented immigrants
SCALE of PROPOSED POLICY
US total population: 340 million
US workforce population: 170 million
US undocumented persons: 12 million
US undocumented workforce: 9 million
US prison population (for comparison): 2 million
IMMEDIATE ECONOMIC IMPACT
Decrease in workforce: 5%
Decrease in GDP: 3%
Sequence of Effects:
1st order – decrease in GDP from fewer workers: -3%
2nd order – inflationary pressure due to supply shortages: 2%
3rd order – inflationary pressure due to workforce shortage: 2%
4th order – US interest rates remain elevated 4-6% for five years
FINANCIAL IMPACT
Higher prices create a de-facto income reduction of ~$2,000 / household against a GDP of $82,000 / household
STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC IMPACT
The undocumented immigrant population is both younger and more likely to be part of the workforce than the general population. Deporting this group will create price pressure in areas where they are heavily employed (hospitality, agriculture, construction, and elder care), leading to both higher prices and higher wages for the remaining workforce. These industries are a greater share of the economy in rural areas, which have fewer high-income service and knowledge workers.
Policy 2: Put Tariffs on Our Trading Partners
SCALE of PROPOSED POLICY
60% tax rate on imports from China, totaling $500 billion / year
20% on all other imports, totaling $3,200 billion / year
Total US Trade is ~$7,500 billion / year, representing 25% of GDP
IMMEDIATE ECONOMIC IMPACT
Imports and exports both estimated to fall by 20%
Domestic consumption will increase to compensate, at higher prices
Sequence of Effects:
1st order – GDP -0.75% on initial impact of tariffs
2nd order – immediate inflationary pressure ~1-2% for five years
3rd order – GDP -0.50% if retaliation from trade partners
4th order – US interest rates remain elevated 2-3% for five years
HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL IMPACT
Higher prices create another, de-facto annual income reduction of ~$2,000 / household against a GDP of $82,000 / household; tariffs do lead to more government income, lowering the annual tax burden by $1,200 / household.
STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC IMPACT
The economic case of tariffs is that they create a buffer that allows domestic industry to mature enough to compete with international industry. At present, the US economy is less trade-oriented (25%) than the global average (63%). The danger is that these tariffs become functionally permanent, and the global economy largely leaves the US behind, causing its relative importance to shrink and/or our trading partners to retaliate with tariffs of their own against US industry.
Policy 3: Shrink Federal Spending and Cut Taxes
SCALE of PROPOSED POLICY
Current federal spending: 6,200 billion
Proposed cuts via DOGE: 1,000 billion
Proposed tax cuts: 1,000 billion
IMMEDIATE ECONOMIC IMPACT
Decrease in debt interest: 100 billion
Decrease in federal deficit (incl tariffs): 350 billion
Short-term GDP decrease: 2.00%
Long-term GDP growth rate increase: 0.5 % / year
Long-term interest rate impact: -0.50 %
HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL IMPACT
This is the Trump policy that’s most difficult to estimate, because there is no current indication of where the cuts might come from. Federal discretionary, non-defense spending is only $900 billion, so even cutting everything except mandatory programs won’t achieve Trump’s goal. Typically, corporate tax cuts have gone to fund share buybacks, and an injection of an additional $1000 billion into the stock market could push the stock bubble further.
STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC IMPACT
Hard to estimate, depending on where cuts come from. Any cuts beyond discretionary and defense spending will have to survive a court challenge and will be politically dangerous. It’s hard to see where the budget cuts come from, particularly since Republican states generally are greater recipients of federal spending dollars than they are payers into the pool.
Total federal spending: 6,200 billion
Federal gov’t discretionary: 900 billion
Federal gov’t defense: 900 billion
Interest on debt: 700 billion
Medicare: 800 billion
Medicaid / other: 700 billion
Social Security: 1,400 billion
Welfare: 300 billion
Vet / Fed retirement, etc.: 300 billion
Other: 200 billion
FROM POLICIES TO POLITICS
Getting from 34% to 51% required Trump to make promises to his base, and they expect him to deliver. If he succeeds in doing so, I can see a story that plays out like this:
• Trump’s three main economic policies: deportation, tariffs, and government restructuring, combined, put upward pressure on interest rates and inflation totaling 5-7% percentage points per year.
• The additional spending and decreased federal tax footprint from these policies increases structural GDP growth by 0.5% per year.
• That growth comes at a recessionary cost of 5-10% of GDP, paid for largely by borrowing, and so implies a payback period of 10 to 20 years.
• Less borrowing at the federal level is offset by borrowing at the household level to compensate for short-term income shocks and putting upward pressure on interest rates. At the same time, supply-side shocks from fewer workers and pricier imports will force industry to raise prices, also putting upward pressure on inflation.
• The Federal Reserve has a mandate to fight inflation before anything else, and it does so by raising interest rates even further, slowing the economy.
• With other countries following the same path, and global institutions losing power, there is substantial risk that the forthcoming global economy will look more like the mercantilism of the 1650s than the American dominance of the 1950s.
• No party in power wants high interest rates in an election year. I expect there to be enormous pressure placed on the Fed to de-emphasize its inflation-fighting mission and keep interest rates low to help Republicans in the 2026 or 2028 election.
[i] I have a clear memory of hearing a recording of this RFK quote, with his distinctive Boston accent and cadence of speech, but I’ve been unable to find its original source. The closest I’ve come is in comments he made to The American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 16, 1964, prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act, when he said, “Whether you oppose the legislation or favor the legislation it seems to me that…what is absolutely essential is for us to comply with the legislation. We may fight out the question of whether the legislation should be passed. But after it’s passed, we should follow it and live up to and see that the law of the United States is obeyed.” In these days of unsourced social media fabrications, I hope I may be forgiven for what is, at worst, a slightly faulty memory in support of the essential principle of fidelity to professional duty.
[ii] The US was the only G20 nation not to sign the Kyoto Accords of 1997, which set targets for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions for each signatory nation. Despite not being a signatory, the US was one of only two nations to hit their Kyoto-assigned targets for emissions, due to our abundant, cheap, and relatively clean natural gas produced by fracking. The other nation was tiny Denmark, surrounded on three sides by water and lots of offshore windmills.
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